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SO WHAT? THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO THE OWNERSHIP
OF FIREARMS UNDER THE NINTH AMENDMENT
ROBERT

E. BODINE*

INTRODUCTION

For the centuries preceding the drafting of the United States
Constitution, political philosophy began to endorse natural rights and
forge a liberal tradition.
Such philosophy resulted in political
revolutions in the United States and France and influenced how new
leaders of those countries shaped their political systems. One of the
rights expressly protected by both federal and state constitutions and
laws in the early United States was the right to keep and bear arms.
That right was based on the "People's" right to be free from tyranny,
either foreign or domestic.
Two schools of thought surfaced
regarding the precise scope of that right. On the one hand, some
believe that the means employed to provide for such freedom was the
recognition of an individual right to keep and bear arms. On the
other hand, some believe that the right, being collective in nature, was
secured only through state regulation.
The Supreme Court of the United States has provided little
direct guidance on this right, and what guidance the Court has
provided is no less than sixty years old. However, even assuming that
the right expressed in the Second Amendment of the United States
Constitution is collective in nature, the issue of whether there exists
an individual right to keep and bear arms still remains unsettled.
Many rights guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions are not
expressly listed within the documents but instead fall under what
amount to "catch-all" provisions. For the U.S. Constitution, that
provision is the Ninth Amendment, which provides that the express
listing of certain rights in the constitution should not be used as a
means to deny to the people other rights retained by them. The
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2000; B.S., Physics,
University of Maryland, 1992. The author would like to thank Elizabeth Falter for her
inspiration and support. This Note is dedicated to the memory of Bruce Albert Bodine, 19381998.
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Court has developed three methods for inference of an unenumerated right under the Constitution: by an appeal to autonomy and
liberty, by an appeal to tradition, or by inference from other
provisions of the Constitution. One may devise an individual right to
possession of firearms under the Ninth Amendment using any one of
those three methods.'
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the views of (1) John Locke,
the single greatest influence on the relevant views of the Founders,
and (2) James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, the Federalists who
drafted the United States Constitution, and (3) the Antifederalists,
the group that opposed ratification of the Constitution. Part II
provides a brief analysis of the relevant provisions of the
Constitution. Part III examines the case law surrounding (1) the
individual right firearms possession and (2) the inference of
unenumerated rights from the Constitution. Part IV implements the
techniques employed by the Supreme Court to deduce that there is
indeed a fundamental right to individual ownership of firearms
whether or not they have application to the security of freedom. Part
V revisits the relevant Supreme Court precedent to demonstrate its
consistency with the notion of a Ninth Amendment, individual right
to keep and bear arms.
I.

LEGAL THEORISTS AND THEIR VIEWS ON
REVOLUTION/REBELLION

To understand the provisions of the Constitution, one must
understand what its drafters sought to protect. This is accomplished
by examining the source of the drafters' inspiration, the views of the
drafters' themselves, the substance of the arguments of the drafters'
opponents, and how precisely that inspiration and debate took form
in the Constitution.

1. The idea of an individual right to the possession of firearms under the Ninth
Amendment is not unique. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An
Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1992);
Roland Docal, The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments- The PrecariousProtectors of the
American Gun Collector, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1101 (1996). The approach of this Note differs
from the prior work in that it does not address the author's opinion on how one should interpret
the Ninth Amendment, but rather the United States Supreme Court's choice on how to do so.
The author then shows that the Court's approach logically supports the adoption of a
fundamental, individual right to keep and bear arms under the Ninth Amendment.
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John Locke (1632-1704)

John Locke represented one of the strongest influences on the
framers, who subscribed to the Lockean principle of property, which
included not only one's possessions but also one's fundamental
(natural) and political (positive) rights. 2 "At least four times in his
Second Treatise, Locke used the word property to mean all that
belongs to a person, especially the rights he wished to preserve.
Americans of the founding generation understood property in this
'3
general Lockean sense, which we have lost."
Locke shared the views of earlier philosophers in that a rebellion
is never justified; however, he put an interesting spin on the issue.
When a government acts tyrannically, it is not the citizenry that
rebels, but rather the government itself. To understand this clearly,
one must first understand Locke's view on the legitimacy of
government. A legitimate government satisfies two conditions. First,
that those who hold office are appropriate by reference to the
Constitution. 4 Second, that the citizenry continues to place their trust
in that constitutional form.5 Thus, if the citizenry no longer places
trust in the Constitution, those previously in power are not authorized
to remain in power. 6 If they refuse to leave their positions, then their
rule is absolute and arbitrary, which fails to respect God's natural
rights.7 In doing so, those individuals put themselves into a state of
war with their people. 8 Thus, as the Latin rebellare (to rebel)
provides, the former leaders "bring back again the state of war." 9
"Moreover, we may do more than engage in civil disobedience; we
have the right to 'appeal to heaven'-that is, resort to arms-against
such rulers."' 10 Such a right is meaningless without some means of
carrying out the logical consequences of that right.
Locke also discussed a more general right to self-preservation,
2. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 135,251 (1999).
3. Id. at 252. Actually, we have not lost this concept entirely. In the often-used phrase
"life, liberty, and property," substantive rights are now seen as a part of liberty instead of
property.
4. D.A. LLOYD THOMAS, LOCKE ON GOVERNMENT 60 (1995).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. NICHOLAS JOLLEY, LOCKE: HIS PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT 218 (1999) (citing JOHN

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, § 222, at 412 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed.
1988) (3d ed. 1698)).
8. Id. (citing LOCKE, supra note 7, § 16, at 278-79).
9. Id. at 217.
10. Id. at 218.
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referring to it as the most fundamental right. In his fifth essay on the
law of nature, Locke noted that "if any law of nature would seem to
be established among all as sacred in the highest degree, ... surely
this is self-preservation, and therefore some lay this down as the chief
and fundamental law of nature."'1 Locke warns that such a right is
12
not absolute, because the right could be used to harm others.
However, protecting one's right to self-preservation is unjustified
only where it is abused by infringing the self-preservation rights of
others. 13 It is on these moral and philosophical bases that James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and the other founders based the
United States Constitution.
B.

The Federalists

"James Madison,... if anyone, was the author of the Constitution, ' 14 and Madison and the Federalists in general were greatly
influenced by the writings of John Locke.
Government was, for Madison, much like it was for Locke, a
neutral arbiter over competing interests ....
As it was for Locke,
so, too, for Madison and the Federalists, justice effectively meant
respecting private rights, especially property rights ... less a matter
of civic virtue, of public participation in politics, .. . than it was a
reflection of the Lockean liberal world of personal rights ....
15
On the other hand, although some Antifederalists were communitarians, some in fact were true liberals who were greatly concerned
with the enlarged federal government and enhanced executive power,
and therefore responded with a call for the Bill of Rights to protect
individual rights. 6 It appears that the debate between the Federalists
and Antifederalists was, not so much one of which is the more noble
goal, but rather what means they would employ to achieve a common
goal: the security of individual rights.
In FederalistNo. 8, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the purpose
of a large, standing federal army was to prevent conflicts between the
states and to "suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or

11. JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature V, in POLITICAL EsSAYS 106, 112 (Mark
Goldie ed., 1997).
12. Id.; see also JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature VI, in POLITICAL ESSAYS,
supra note 11, at 116-17.
13. See THOMAS, supra note 4, at 18 (citing LOCKE, supra note 7).
14. Editor'sIntroduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 11, 13 (Penguin Books 1987).
15. Id. at 55.
16. See Editor'sIntroduction,supra note 14, at 60-61.
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insurrection...."- However, he also noted that such an army would
"be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the
great body of people." ' Thus, the people must collectively be able to
defeat the federal army. In this light, even if the Second Amendment
represented a state (as opposed to an individual) right, the current
National Guard and state Reserves would not qualify as a state militia
because they are subject to federal control. In the absence of a truly
state-based militia, the people are all that qualify.
In Federalist No. 26, Hamilton again wrote in favor of a large
standing army, arguing that so long as the power to call such a force
into use remained in the hands of the legislature, as opposed to the
chief executive, that power would not easily be abused.19 Later, in
Federalist No. 29, Hamilton assured that where the standing army
would be called into service for the Union, the states would still
maintain power over the "appointment of the officers, and the
authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress." 20 Hamilton also observed that the standing army could
never be expected to be used against the states because their total
number would always be less than the "large body of citizens, little if
at all inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand
' 21
ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens."
Madison confirmed this line of reasoning in FederalistNo. 46.22 He23
concluded that the federal army would not exceed 30,000 troops.
"To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a
million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen
from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties and
united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and
confidence." 24 These passages suggest two things: that the ordinary
citizen was expected to be well trained even though not necessarily
serving in the armed forces, and that their purpose in doing so was to
serve the necessary function of the defense of liberty.
These passages from The Federalistpapers demonstrate the great
concern that the founders had for tyranny at the hands of an

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books 1987).

Id.
THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books 1987).
THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 208 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books 1987).

Id. at 210.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 297-302 (James Madison) (Penguin Books 1987).
Id. at 301.
Id.
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unchecked government. Against the backdrop of this showing of
concern, in FederalistNo. 28, Hamilton characterized the underlying
right at stake as that of "self-defense. '25 Echoing Locke's view on the
right to self-preservation, Hamilton characterized this as an "original
right ...paramount to all positive forms of government. '26 Hamilton
then proceeded to distinguish between the threat of tyranny posed by
the federal and state governments. 2 The state militia could easily
serve the purpose of repelling tyranny from the federal government,
but where the state government was the source of tyranny, the task of
self-defense would be extremely difficult, such that "there must be a
peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular
resistance." 8 The collective right protected by the Second Amendment, therefore, would not be sufficient to meet all the threats
contemplated by Madison and Hamilton.
C.

The Antifederalists

Despite this language, the Antifederalists were nevertheless
concerned that the Constitution proposed by the Federalists did not
adequately protect individual rights, and they called for a limiting Bill
of Rights designed to do S0.29 In fact, the Supreme Court has noted
that without the promise of a limiting Bill of Rights, it is doubtful that
the Constitution would have been ratified.30 There are countless
examples of Antifederalist writings to this effect. For example,
Agrippa 3l wrote that:
[A] declaration of rights is of inestimable value. It contains those
principles which the government never can invade without an open
violation of the compact between them and the citizens....
Without such an express declaration the states are an annihilated in
reality upon receiving this constitution [without a Bill of Rights]3 -2
the forms will be preserved only during the pleasure of Congress.

25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 204, 206 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books 1987).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Editor's Introduction, supra note 14, 60-61.
30. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
31. Apparently Agrippa was a pseudonym for James Winthrop, a Revolutionary War
veteran from Massachusetts. See HERBERT J. STORING, THE ANTIFEDERALIST 227 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1985).
32. See id. at 239.
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Brutus 33 added that the provisions of the Bill of Rights "are as
necessary under the [federal] government as under that of the
34
individual states.
In response to the existence of a large standing army, the
Antifederalists demanded that the people's right to keep and bear
arms be protected expressly in the Bill of Rights. 35 They appeared to
show great concern for the unchecked power of the federal
government while seeming content that state government was
insufficiently distant from the will of the people to pose the same sort
or threat. As Wilson Nichols noted, organized, professional armies
were a necessary evil that could be kept in check by a militia
composed of the common people.3 6 Moreover, Brutus warned that

any government power, such as that of the right to keep a military
presence, that tends towards abridging the rights of its citizens must,
"if given at all ...be so restricted as to prevent the ill effect of its

operation."37 Recognizing that the nature of the federal government
permits abuses more easily than a state government, Patrick Henry
wrote that a standing army would likely develop and serve its own
interests at the expense of individual interests.38 These expressions
show that tyranny at the hands of government was clearly on the
mind of the Antifederalists as well.
D. Summary

Recognizing an individual right to firearms would certainly go a
long way toward protecting against the concerns that were clearly
contemplated by the Federalists and Antifederalists, and would serve
the bargain they struck in ratifying the Constitution. Although the
scope of the Second Amendment may not cover such a right, the fact
that it would greatly serve this serious concern, which relates to the
most fundamental of rights, would suggest that it is a perfect
candidate for an unenumerated right. In addition, one should
consider other serious threats to self-preservation in inferring a Ninth
33. Identity unclear, but likely either Robert Yates or Thomas Treadwell. See id. at 103.
34. Id. at 120.
35. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 147 ("All adult males were required to own arms and serve
in the militia, which, as Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts stated, existed 'to prevent the
establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty."').
36. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

321, 356 (enlarged ed. 1992).
37. See STORING, supra note 31, at 151.
38. Id. at 303-04.
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Amendment right to keep and bear arms. If taking a nonoriginalist
approach to constitutional interpretation, purely modern concerns
surface that also justify such an inference.
II. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
The founders' concern for self-preservation is apparent;
however, the question still remains whether they protected such a
right. The next step in answering that question is to look at the law
itself.
A.

The Bill of Rights

The Bill of Rights was drafted and adopted in response to the
requests of the Antifederalists, who were concerned that the
Constitution, having centralized many important powers in a strong
federal government, did not adequately protect individual rights.3 9
Because there was no fear that the state governments would ever
infringe these rights, the Bill of Rights did not restrict state power.
1.

The Second Amendment

A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the 40right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.

Seems simple enough. Not really. The purpose of the Second
Amendment is to protect us from tyranny. 41 Thus, the Second
Amendment does not protect us from crime, wildlife, or any other
threat, however important protection from that threat may be. The
United States Code defines the militia as
(a) [A]II able-bodied males at least 17 years of age, and.., under
45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of

intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female
citizens who are commissioned officers of the National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are-

39. See discussion supra Part II.D.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
41. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (refusing to protect a sawed-off
shotgun on Second Amendment grounds because it was unclear that "its use could contribute to
the common defense"); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) ("[T]he states cannot...
prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their
rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing
their duty to the general government.").
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(1) the organized militia, which consist of the National Guard
and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of
the militia who42 are not members of the National Guard or the
Naval Militia.
The Oxford English Dictionary similarly defines the militia as a term
"employed in [a] more restricted sense ... to denote a 'citizen army'
as distinguished from a body of mercenaries or professional
soldiers. '43 Additionally, Trenchard, a writer who influenced the
founders, referred to the militia as a necessary civil power to check
45
the military power."a Thus, whether appealing to historical writings,
the letter of the law, 46 or plain English, the militia was not intended to
consist (exclusively) of military personnel, but rather ordinary citizens
as well.
If all [the Second Amendment] meant was the right to be a soldier
or serve in the military, whether in the militia or the army, it would
hardly be a cherished right and would never have reached
constitutional status in the Bill of Rights. Pennsylvania, whose
constitution of 1776 first used the
phrase "the right to bear arms,"
47
did not even have a state militia.
Taking the view that "the Second Amendment guarantees a collective
rather than an individual right," 48 the state retains a power to organize
and regulate a civilian-based military force directly under its
command. Regardless, however, of whom the militia consists, that
right has a particular scope: possession and use of firearms in a
military context. It logically follows that individual or collective
access to firearms with no realistic military application is not
protected under the Second Amendment; however, the fact that the

42. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1994).
43. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTONARY 768 (2d ed. 1989).
44. See BAILYN, supra note 36, at 62.
45. See Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 1976) ("In interpreting a constitutional
provision, the fundamental principle of construction is to give the provision the effect intended
by the framers and the people adopting it.") (citing Whitman v. Nat'l Bank of Oxford, 176 U.S.
559 (1900)).
46. In the Supreme Court's words:
It is appropriate to read the conviction expressed in a memorable address by Senator
Albert J. Beveridge to the American Bar Association in 1920 .... His appeal was to
the Constitution-to the whole Constitution, not to a mutilating selection of those
parts only which for the moment find favor. To view a particular provision of the Bill
of Rights with disfavor inevitably results in a constricted application of it. This is to
disrespect the Constitution.
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1956).
47. LEVY, supra note 2, at 135.
48. United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976).
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militia is clearly a collection of civilians is of great consequence to any

analysis of the right to keep and bear arms.
2.

The Ninth Amendment

The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not
49 be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
The Federalists opposed the Bill of Rights basically on two

grounds: that it was unnecessary, and that it was in fact dangerous.0
The Bill of Rights was unnecessary because, as a limited government,

the federal government did not have a power unless it was expressly
granted."
Thus, absent an express grant of a power to restrict
freedom of speech, it lacked the power to do so; therefore, no
protection from such abuse was needed. On the other hand, the Bill
of Rights was dangerous because a specific listing of rights could

imply that the federal government was not limited, but instead
52
general.

An incomplete listing of rights could result in an

implication that other rights did not exist.53 For other Federalists, the
issue seemed ridiculous. Noah Webster, for example, observed that
the fear of a standing army was so strongly entwined in American

society that there was no need to forbid it.14 Madison originally
agreed with this position, but eventually changed his mind, in part out
of concern for the minority, answering such concerns with what was
to become the Ninth Amendment. He told Thomas Jefferson that

"[w]hereever the real power in a Government lies, there is a danger
of oppression .... The majority, it seemed, were as capable of
despotism as any [monarch]."" 5 This was wise in hindsight because
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
50. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 244-46.
51. ld.
52. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
537 (1998).
53. See id. ("Too precise an enumeration of the people's rights was dangerous because it
would be implying.., that every right not included ... might be impaired .... ) (internal
quotations omitted).
54. See BAILYN, supra note 36, at 354 ("Do the states outlaw standing armies? No (with a
couple of exceptions). And is civilian government in the states threatened by military coup
d'etats?"). The second question was rhetorical, suggesting that the states would never infringe
basic human rights. That is, they were not the threat that they arguably are today, perhaps due
to the immense growth in their populations. A necessary inference from this perspective is that
little discussion ever occurred on the issue of protecting individual rights from state infringement
because such infringement was highly improbable. The Ninth Amendment would seem to be
even better applicable to such a change in circumstances as it would be to historical examples of
unspecified infringements.
55. Id. at 410.
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many cases have arisen under the Bill of Rights in which governments
have exceeded their authority, and the judiciary has been instrumental in vindicating the rights of the people.
Madison wrote the Ninth Amendment, and submitted a total of
twelve amendments (ten of which were ratified), yet he did not
include protection of the freedom of speech. 6 This freedom was as
important to Madison as it is to present day Americans; therefore, it
is clear that this is a right Madison originally sought to include in the
Ninth Amendment. 7 Madison discussed these concerns, noting that
although the federal government is one of general powers, its
discretionary powers-stemming in part from the "necessary and
proper" clauses of the legislative powers-posed a threat to those
unenumerated rights.5 8 Madison responded:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration,
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not
singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
general government, and were consequently insecure. I have
[addressed this concern], as gentlemen
may see by turning to the
59
last clause of the 4th resolution.
The clause to which this passage refers was the precursor of the Ninth
Amendment. 6° "For 175 years, from 1791 to 1965, the Ninth
Amendment lay dormant.... "61 From 1965 to 1980, however, "the
Ninth Amendment was invoked in more than twelve hundred state
and federal cases in the most astonishing variety of matters. ' 62 How
the Supreme Court has dealt with unenumerated rights will be
discussed in Part IV.B.

56. See LEvY, supra note 2, at 249-50.
57. Id.
58. See James Madison, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, June 8, 1789, at
<http://www.federalist.com/madamend.htm> (last visited Jan. 23, 2001).
59. Id.
60. The text of the clause was as follows:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall not be construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained
by the people; or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as
actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
Id.
61. LEVY, supra note 2, at 241.
62. Id. at 242.
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The Fourteenth Amendment

It was only through the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
63
that the Bill of Rights was made enforceable against the states.
Although this may lead to difficulties with interpretation of the
Second Amendment, 64 Supreme Court case law clearly supports
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit state violation

of Ninth Amendment rights. The Fourteenth Amendment makes any
fundamental right, privilege, or immunity that belongs to a citizen of
65
the United States independent of that person's state citizenship.
However, not all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights have been
enforced against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Palko v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court introduced the doctrine of

"selective incorporation." 66 Under that doctrine, the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates only specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights. 67 The Court held that the double jeopardy prohibition of the
Fifth Amendment did not satisfy that doctrine. 68 In Benton v.
Maryland, however, the Court overruled Palko on this point, holding
that the double jeopardy provision is incorporated through the

Fourteenth Amendment precisely because it is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice. 69 In doing so, the Court noted that "[t]he
fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can
hardly be doubted. Its origins can be traced to Greek and Roman

63. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997) (recognizing the wide
variety of rights within the Constitution and the Bill of Rights that are made enforceable on the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
64. There are two apparent problems with application of the Second Amendment through
the Fourteenth Amendment. First, if the original purpose was to protect the states and the
people from the tyranny of the federal government, can its purpose now be to protect us from
the tyranny of state governments? Second, if the Second Amendment protects only a state
right, does its application through the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the state from infringing
its own right? If so, the mechanism of the Fourteenth Amendment produces nonsense, and
should not apply.
The answer to the first question is undoubtedly, "Yes." The framers did not protect the
people from state violations of individual rights, and so the Fourteenth Amendment extends
many protections not originally provided by the framers. The second question is a bit more
difficult, but falls outside the scope of this Note. The reader should also note that this problem
exists only if the Second Amendment does not protect an individual right (which is an
assumption of the author), and perhaps only if one adopts an originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation.
65. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
66. See 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969).
67. See id. at 324-25.
68. See id. at 328.
69. See Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
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times, and it became established in the common law of England long
before this Nation's independence. ' 70 Thus, the Court extends more,
not less, protection of fundamental rights recognized by governments
on which the American government was based. Moreover, in Paul v.
Davis, the Court held that the determination of an alleged right's
constitutional status is whether it had been "initially recognized and
protected by state law. ' 71 Finally, in San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez, the Supreme Court's dicta arguably stated that any right
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is a fundamental right.72 The Court
may, therefore, be shifting to a "complete incorporation" approach.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Louisiana
was faced with the argument that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of
indictment by a grand jury before trial was applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.7 3 The Court noted that it had
never held that the Fifth Amendment requirement of a grand jury
74
was applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although it recognized that it had previously ruled such a right
inapplicable to the states because it was not "fundamental to the
American scheme of justice," it chose not to re-address the issue,
following its "usual custom of avoiding decision of a constitutional
issue[] unnecessary to the decision of the case before" them, which
they overturned on other grounds.75 However, as we shall see, the
Ninth Amendment has subsequently been interpreted to include
within it rights that have nothing to do with the system of justice and
procedure, yet have been held applicable to the states. Thus the
argument that Alexander, speaking on the subject in dicta some
twenty-eight years ago, stands in the way of recognition of a
fundamental, individual right to keep and bear arms is of little weight.
Moreover, under the traditional liberal doctrines of Locke and
Madison, Hamilton, and the other founders, it seems that justice is
70. Id. at 795.
71. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,710 (1976).
72. See 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) ("It is this question-whether education is a fundamental
right, in the sense that it is among the rights and libertiesprotected by the Constitution-whichhas
so consumed the attention of courts and commentators in recent years.") (emphasis added).
The Court's single sentence has been cited for the proposition that perhaps the Court seeks to
expand the list of fundamental rights to include all rights secured under the Constitution. See,
e.g., Stefan Tahmassebi, The Bill of Rights & the States, at <http://nraila.org/research19990728BillofRightsCivilRights-001.html> (last visited Oct. 9, 1999). Although this is a far cry from
overruling the doctrine of selective incorporation, it could be seen as a first and necessary step.
73. See 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972)
74. See id.
75. Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
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III. AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
A.

The Supreme Court on the Possessionand Use of Firearms

Before addressing Ninth Amendment rights to firearms, it is
necessary to review the Supreme Court's previous treatment of gun
rights. These cases all deal with issues brought under the auspices of
the Second Amendment. Although they need not be consistent with
the conclusions of this Note because a different law is addressed, to
the extent that they are consistent, courts will have an easier time
accepting private ownership of firearms under this alternate theory.
In Presser v. Illinois, the Court upheld a $10 fine for Herman
Presser's participation in a parade where he and others "with
arms,.., had associated themselves together as a military company
and organization, without having a license from the governor, and not
being a part of, or belonging to, the regular organized volunteer
militia of the state of Illinois. ' '76 The Court held that the Second
Amendment does protect the right to keep and bear arms from state
government infringement, but in dicta recognized that "[i]t is
undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute
7
the reserve militia of the United States as well as of the states."
Next, in Miller v. Texas, the Court again upheld a conviction based on
a state statute prohibiting the carrying of a pistol in public. 78 The
Court echoed its sentiments in Presser, but added that "if the
fourteenth amendment limited the power of the states as to such
rights.., we think it was fatal to this claim that it was not set up in the
trial court.

' 79

Therefore, at this point, the Court had not yet ruled on

whether the Fourteenth Amendment extended the prohibitions of the
Bill of Rights to state action.
The next and last case in which the Supreme Court directly
addressed the Second Amendment was United States v. Miller.0 In
that case, Jack Miller was charged with unlawfully transporting an
unregistered, sawed-off shotgun (i.e., having a barrel less than 18

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

116 U.S. 252, 254 (1886) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
153 U.S. 535 (1894).
Id. at 538.
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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inches in length) in interstate commerce. 8' The Court upheld the
conviction, and this case became the banner of the gun control
movement.

However, a closer inspection of the language of the

Court reveals that this was not the victory that that movement claims
it to have been. First, the language of the court clearly supports the
definition of the militia set forth in the discussion of Part III.A.1
above.82 Second, the Court demands that application of the Second

Amendment always consider the purpose of the Amendment, which
was "to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness
of [the militia]." 83 Finally, the Court upheld the conviction on the
grounds that the possession of a sawed-off shotgun did not relate to

the security of a free state. 84 Thus, the first conclusion of the Court in
United States v. Miller was that personal ownership of military
firearms would be protected under the Second Amendment as being

necessary to the security of a free state. 8 The second conclusion,
however, is that personal ownership of non-military firearms 86 would
not be similarly protected under the Second Amendment.

The second conclusion is not one with which gun rights advocates
agree, and perhaps the holding in United States v. Miller goes against

everything for which the framers stood on this issue. Nevertheless, in
the absence of any subsequent and contradictory interpretation of the
Second Amendment by the Court, this stands as the law. This
analysis now begs one question: does the Constitution nevertheless

protect a right to personal ownership of non-military firearms? The
answer is given in the sections that follow.

81. Id.
82. See id. at 179 ("The sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies.... [T]he
militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common
defense.... [T]hese men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of
the kind in common use at the time.") (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 178.
84. Id. at 177.
85. But see Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057, 1058 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting
the claim that United States v. Miller "stands for the proposition that Congress may regulate
only those classes of weapons which have no relationship to the militia"); Harris v. State, 432
P.2d 929, 930 (Nev. 1967) ("The right to bear arms does not apply to private citizens as an
individual right.") (citing Miller II, 307 U.S. 174 (1938)).
86. By "non-military firearms," the author is including handguns, shotguns, and rifles that
do not constitute semi-automatic or automatic weapons. Although these weapons arguably
have a military use, yet another assumption of this paper is that they are not within the scope of
Second Amendment protection. Such an assumption is consistent (at least in part) with the
holding in United States v. Miller.
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The Supreme Courton UnenumeratedRights

The starting points for interpreting the Ninth Amendment are the
text itself and the rule of construction which holds that if a plain
meaning exists, it should be followed.... If a plain meaning does
not exist, the language of the text must be construed so as not to
contradict the document at any point, and meaning must be sought
in its purposes or in the principles that it embodies
as understood
87
from its nature and object, its scope and design.
The Supreme Court has accepted only three unenumerated
rights: association, travel, and privacy. The justifications through
which the Court derives these rights are (1) an appeal to notions of
autonomy and liberty, (2) inference through other provisions of the
Constitution, and (3) recognition of a traditional basis for such a
right. Although these methods share some overlap, the Court has at
times treated each method separate from the others. The private
right to non-military firearms may be derived using any of these
methods.
1.

An Appeal to Core Notions of Autonomy and Liberty: The Right
to Travel

In United States v. Guest, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he
constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and
necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of
interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to
the concept of our Federal Union." ' Three years later, the Court in
Shapiro v. Thompson further held that "[o]ur constitutional concepts
of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by
statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict
this movement. '89 Thus, the Court's long-standing case law refuses to
attribute this right to any one provision of the Constitution, but
instead relies upon a fundamental concept of liberty on which the
Constitution was based. 90
The right to travel, therefore, is a
87. LEVY, supra note 2, at 244 (internal quotations omitted).
88. 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
89. 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969), overruledon other grounds, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); see also Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) ("Undoubtedly the right of
locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an
attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the
territory of any state is a right secured by the 14th Amendment and by other provisions of the
Constitution.").
90. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630 n.8. The cases cited had found the right to travel inherent
in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities
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fundamental right that is derived from our notions of autonomy and
liberty. This represents the first method of inferring unenumerated
rights: through an appeal to the notions of autonomy and liberty.
2.

Deduction through Inference: The Freedom of Association

In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, writing for the

Court, held that there was a right to association within the First
Amendment, noting that association is a form of expression of
opinion. 91 The Court went on to hold that "while it is not expressly
included in the First Amendment, its existence is necessary in making
the express guarantees fully meaningful." 92 The Court further held

that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life

and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 93 The
Court then cited the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments,

as well

as relevant case law, to

support that

proposition. 94
One year later, in DeGregory v. Attorney General of New

Hampshire, the Court threw out a contempt charge against a
defendant who had been sent to prison because of his refusal to

answer questions about his alleged association with the Communist
Party. 9
The Court reasoned that, absent any overriding and
compelling state interest, there was nothing "that would warrant

intrusion into the realm of political and associational privacy
protected by the First Amendment.

'96

The freedom of association,

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause. See also Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 648 (1977) (holding that the right to privacy is inherent in the security of
liberty as that term appears in the Fourteenth Amendment); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (holding that privacy includes "only personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"') (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (emphasis added).
91. See 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 484 (citations omitted).
94. See id. at 484-85 (citations omitted).
95. See 383 U.S. 825, 827-28 (1966).
96. Id. at 829; see also NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). In
ClairborneHardware,the Court wrote:
We have not been slow to recognize that the protection of the First Amendment bars
subtle as well as obvious devices by which political association might be stifled. Thus
we have held that forced disclosure of one's political associations is, at least in the
absence of a compelling state interest, inconsistent with the First Amendment's
guaranty of associational privacy.... [W]e have held that civil or criminal disabilities
may not be imposed on one who joins an organization which has among its purposes
the violent overthrow of the Government, unless the individual joins knowing of the
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therefore, is a fundamental right that is necessarily derived from
another constitutional provision in order to make that provision
meaningful. This represents the second method of inferring unenumerated rights: through inference.
3.

Protecting Traditionally Recognized Rights: The Right of Privacy

By far, privacy is the unenumerated right with the most support
(and definition) in Supreme Court case law. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Brennan, relied solely on the Ninth Amendment
to hold unconstitutional the Connecticut statute at issue, which
prohibited the use of contraceptives. 97 Justice Goldberg, therefore,
also employed the method of inference to derive the general right to
privacy. 98 However, Justice Goldberg also relied upon a deeply
rooted tradition of marital privacy:
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deeprooted in
our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed
because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first
eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth
Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever. 99
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges.., must look
to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" to
determine whether a principle is "so rooted [there] ...as to be

ranked as fundamental."' 10
The concurrences of Justices Harlan10 1 and White 10 2 relied upon the
notion of liberty as that term is defined in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Roe v. Wade, the landmark abortion rights case, is probably the
most influential precedent for privacy rights.1 3 In Roe, a woman
seeking an abortion brought an action for declaratory and injunctive
relief, arguing that a Texas statute-making it a crime to procure an

organization's illegal purposes and with the specific intention to further those
purposes.
Id. at 932 (citations omitted); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967) ("The First
Amendment ...imposes limitations upon governmental abridgement of 'freedom to associate
and privacy in one's associations."') (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
97. See 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
98. See id. at 484-85.
99. Id. at 491.
100. Id. at 493 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
101. See id. at 500.
102. See id. at 502.
103. See 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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abortion except to save the life of the mother-was unconstitutional. 1°4 The Court found that "the right to privacy.., founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of liberty.., is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."' 15 However, the Court noted that like all fundamental
rights, this one was not absolute. "Where certain fundamental rights
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights
may be justified only by a compelling state interest, and that
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake."' 0 6 This is one of many times that
the Court has set the standard against which a statute infringing a
fundamental right must be measured. In Roe itself, a compelling state
interest was found to exist after the third trimester of pregnancy. 01 7
Specifically, the Court took notice of the state's interests in protecting
the health of the mother and the potential life of the unborn.01 8 As for
the interest in protecting the health of the mother, the point at which
the state's interest becomes compelling is the end of the first
trimester. 1 9 Regulations that would narrowly serve that interest
would include licensing and standardizing of both those practicing
abortions and the facilities at which they are performed. 10 As for the
interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn, that point
occurs at the end of the second trimester."' "If the State is interested
in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve
'112
the life or health of the mother.
In United States v. Orito, the Supreme Court refused to extend

the fundamental right to privacy in viewing obscene material to

3
include a correlative right to receive it, transport it, or distribute it."
The Court noted that "[t]he Constitution extends special safeguards
to the privacy of the home, just as it protects other special privacy

rights such as those of marriage, procreation, motherhood, child
104. See id at 117-18.
105. Id. at 153.
106. Id. at 155.
107. See id. at 156.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 163.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 164-63; see also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (holding that a
state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing
construction by the state courts and its deterrent effect is both real and substantial).
113. See 413 U.S. 139, 141 (1973).
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rearing, and education.' 1 4 Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
took care to note, however, "(a) that obscene material is not
protected under the First Amendment, (b) that the Government has a
legitimate interest in protecting the public commercial environment
by preventing such material from entering the stream of commerce,
and (c) that no constitutionally protected privacy is involved.""' 5 The
Court also had the Roe v. Wade decision behind it, and so this holding
should be considered in light of that precedent. That is, the right to
an abortion clearly carried with the mother beyond the home and
even into interstate travel.116
In Katz v. United States, the defendant's conviction was overturned after law enforcement officials obtained evidence through the
installation of an electronic listening device, or bug, in a public phone
booth.' ,7 The Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to
privacy-i.e., his right to be left alone-may be inferred from other
provisions of the Constitution."8 This right is as sacrosanct as the
rights to life and property, 119 and was violated when the government
intruded under circumstances where the defendant reasonably
expected privacy even though he was in a public place. 120 On the
other hand, the Court also recognized that as sacred as this right was,
like life and property, protection of privacy is "left largely to the law
of the individual States.' 12'
4.

Summary of the Deduction of Unenumerated Rights

Summarizing the case law appearing in this Part, the express
guarantee of a fundamental constitutional right necessarily implies
unenumerated rights where such implied rights are necessary to make
the express rights meaningful. Moreover, those implied rights are
themselves fundamental. Fundamental rights are also necessarily
inferred where they are demanded by our basic notions of autonomy
114. Id. at 142 (emphasis added); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65
(holding that the "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimaciesof the home")
(emphasis added).
115. Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
116. See id. at 162 (holding that the state's compelling interest applied to abortions
performed both on citizens and non-citizens of the state who sought medical treatment in the
state, thus recognizing that abortion would have an impact on interstate travel).
117. See 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
118. See id. at 510. The Court cited the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.
119. See id. at 350-51.
120. See id. at 352.
121. Id. at 350-51.
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and liberty. Additionally, deeply rooted traditions, especially those
traditionally recognized by state law, are deemed fundamental.
Finally, even activity not protected in and of itself may nonetheless be
protected within the confines of a person's home.

IV.

THE UNENUMERATED INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO FIREARMS

Using any of the three methods of deriving an unenumerated,
fundamental right, an individual right to firearms arises. Part III.B
showed the three ways through which the U.S. Supreme Court has
inferred unenumerated rights. This Note will now show that, using
any of these three methods in the manner traditionally employed by
the Court, an individual fundamental right to keep and bear arms
arises. In fact, failure to recognize such a right would be inconsistent
with all of those cases cited above that have dealt with unenumerated
rights.
A.

Acceptance Based on Notions of Autonomy and Liberty

In a democracy, the true sovereign is the people. Although many
Americans have their own opinions as to what liberty is and what it
requires, most agree that liberty includes a general right to selfdefense and, more generally, self-preservation. Certainly the private
ownership of firearms that are easy to obtain, operate, and maintain
serve these interests. This conclusion is consistent with the views of
those who wrote the Constitution, and those who influenced its
authors.122 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has derived at least one
test for determining what rights are fundamental to liberty; to wit,
whether the right was traditionally recognized by state law, 123 and
state law has always protected the right to keep and bear arms. In
fact, forty-four states have within their constitutions a provision
protecting the right to keep and bear arms, some of which expressly
protect the right as individual.124
122. See discussion supra Part II.
123. See discussion supra Parts III.B., IV.B.3.
124. See Tahmassebi, supra note 72. Some examples from states representing the first few
and last few states to have been admitted to the Union:
A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and
state, and for hunting and recreational use. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20 (as amended Apr.
16,1987).
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but the General
Assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne. GA.
CONST. art. I, I VIII.
All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves, their

1384

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 76:1363

Acceptance by Inference

No constitutional guarantee enjoys preference over another; all
provisions have equal weight." 5 Therefore, it is no less reasonable to
infer fundamental rights from the Second Amendment and the

Constitution than from the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments. The Second Amendment places with the states the
power to repel an attack against its very nature as a sovereign. That
is, it protects a state's right to self-preservation. Similarly, an
individual right to firearms grants the individual that same power: the
right to self-preservation through self-defense and acquisition of
subsistence through hunting. Moreover, the individual right to
firearms is necessary to make the Second Amendment meaningful.
Because the militia consists in part of non-military personnel, and
because that segment of the militia does not receive military training,
their availability for immediate call into service would depend upon

training received outside of military service. Absent an individual
right to firearms, this is impossible to expect. Furthermore, under the
logic of Orito, even if ownership of firearms itself is not a
fundamental right per se, the interest of privacy certainly justifies
ownership of a firearm in one's home.
C. Acceptance Based on Tradition
The Supreme Court's test for determining what rights are
fundamental to liberty blends the question of liberty with the
question of whether a right was traditionally recognized. The fact
that so many of the states, including the original thirteen, included the
protection of an individual right to keep and bear arms demonstrates

families, their property and the state. N.H. CONST. art. I, § 2(a). A well regulated
militia is the proper, natural, and sure defense, of a state. N.H. CONST. art. I, § 24.
That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is
the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of peace,
should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. VA. CONST. art. 1, §
13.
A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. The individual right to keep and
bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the State or a political subdivision of the
State. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19.
The military shall be held in strict subordination to the civil power. HAW. CONST. art
I, § 16. A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. HAW. CONST. art I, § 17.
125. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 429 (1956).
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that such a right is well grounded in tradition. "For example, several
towns and a few colonies required subjects to go about armed, even
on the way to church. Internal dangers and the possibility of
insurrection, as well as foreign and Indian dangers, explain such
26
legislation."
In addition, two influential treatises both recognized the right to
keep and bear arms.'2 7 Blackstone's Commentaries grounded this
right on the natural rights of resistance and self-preservation. 128 Its
American counterpart, Blackstone's Commentaries, with Notes of
Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the FederalGovernment of
the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia, the 1790 treatise
of St. George Tucker, also recognized the right. Tucker, however,
insisted that the English version of this right as specified by
Blackstone did not adequately protect the individual right. 129 Both of
these treatises have been cited often by American courts and
continue to be cited today.130
V.

REVISITING THE CASE LAW

Would recognition of a Ninth Amendment right to keep and
bear arms be inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent on the
Second Amendment? Absolutely not. First, the Supreme Court has
not even addressed the issue of incorporation of the Second
Amendment protections through the Fourteenth Amendment. The
issue remains open as to whether such a right is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice. Second, the Court has never heard a
case bringing a Ninth Amendment argument for gun rights. United
States v. Miller addressed the question of the possession of shotguns
126. LEVY, supra note 2, at 140. These laws themselves would be unconstitutional under the
Ninth (or Second) Amendment because the right to keep and bear arms, like many
constitutional rights, should include the corresponding negative right to neither keep nor bear
arms. The legislation is informative, however, in establishing that the right is deeply rooted in
American culture.
127. Dave Kopel, Our 2nd Amendment: The Original Perspective, at <http://nraila.org/
research/9991004-BitlofRightsCivilRights-001.shtml> (last visited Oct. 9, 1999).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (citing Commentaries for the recognition of sovereign immunity in English Law); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 141 (1999)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Commentariesfor the recognition of the admissibility of hearsay
statements that were against the interest of the declarant); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
41, 54 (1999) (citing Commentaries on the fundamental right of travel); Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (citing Commentaries on the right of trial by jury in criminal cases); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296 n.2 (1964) (citing Commentaries to demonstrate the
traditional grounding of the First Amendment).
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under the Second Amendment, which under the assumptions of this
Note would appropriately fall outside the Second Amendment. Thus,
there is no precedential barrier to recognizing a Ninth Amendment
right to keep and bear arms.
CONCLUSION

Our Constitution was based upon a liberal tradition formed over
and upheld throughout several centuries. Although the Supreme
Court has not visited the issue of gun control in several decades, the
mounting attacks against that right-peculiarly, coming primarily
from those Americans that refer to themselves as liberals-should
motivate the Court to reaffirm the reasoning of its prior case law. At
the core of American liberal tradition is the fundamental right to selfpreservation, and that right itself represents the core of liberal theory
in general. To be truly faithful to such a tradition requires the
recognition of the right to self-preservation, which has many
enemies-from crime to tyranny. However, by employing any of its
methods for inferring an unenumerated right, the Court can protect
our individual right to keep and bear arms, a right that was supported
by those that drafted the Constitution. Once this right is formally
recognized by the Court, that decision will force other courts to
employ the proper level of scrutiny in addressing legislation abridging
that right.

